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ABS'W_C_
The Shuttle reinforces its policy of fire-preventive measures with onboard smoke detectors and
Ha]on 1301 fire extinguishers. The forthcoming Space Station Freedom will have expanded fire pro-
tection with photoelectric smoke detectors, radiation flame detectors, and both fixed and portable car-
bon dioxide fire extinguishers. Many design and operational issues remain to be resolved for Freedom.
In particular, the fire-suppression designs must consider the problems ofgns leakage in toxic concen-
trations, alternative systems for single-failure redundancy, and commonality with the corresponding
systems of the Freedom international partners. While physical and engineering requirements remain
the primary driving forces for spacecra]_ fire-safety technology, there are, nevertheless, needs and
opportunities for the application of microgravity combustion knowledge to improve and optimize the
fire-protective systems.
INTRODUCTION
Fire safety in spacecrat_ has been cited as one practical motivation for advancing microgravity
combustion research (ref. 1). Current spacecrm°c fire protection, however, is based largely on esta-
blished fire-safety practices used in enclosed compartments, such as aircraft (ref. 2). The application
of fundamental, quantitative information from microgravity combustion research could promote greater
efficiency in the design and operation of protective systems, lessen restrictions on the use of materials
and operations in space-based hardware, and reduce excessive safety factors and false alarms. Cer-
tainly, the advent of the complex, permanently orbiting Space Station Freedom offers an opportunity
for novel and improved spacecrat% fire-safety techniques derived from a thorough understanding of fire
behavior in low gravity (ref. 3).
Thispaper isthusa reviewto acquaintthe microgravitycombustionresearchcommunity with
currentand proposedfire-safetypracticesand criticalissuesforU.S.human-crew spacecraf_and to
suggestrelevantfieldswhere microgravitycombustionresearchmay promote spacecraRfiresafety.
HAZARD ANALYSES FOR SPACECRAFP
General Strategies
The major emphasis in spacecraf_ fire safety is on fire prevention through control, if not elimina-
tion, of one of the three elements necessary for fire, L e., fuel, ignition, and oxygen (ref. 4). For the
first element, the control is based on a policy of qualifying acceptable materials for spacecrai_ use
through tests of the resistance to upward (in normal-gravity) flame spread following exposure to
promoted ignition. Of course, many necessary spacecra]_ items fail this test (including articles made
from paper and fabrics). Usage of these materials is permitted in limited quantities under prescribed
conditions of fire-safe storage. For the second element, control of ignition is through standard prac-
tices of electrical grounding, circuit breakers, pressure containment, and the like. There is no control
of the third element, oxygen. The Shuttle atmosphere is sea-level air, which is enriched to 30% oxygen
at a reduced total pressure of 72 kPa for prebreathing prior to an extravehicular activity. The use of
fire-resistant, reduced-oxygen atmospheres for human support in submarines and other enclosed
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habitatshas been investigated(rof.5). For the Shuttleand the initialphases ofthe Space Station
Freedom, however, designand operationalconsiderationseliminatethe considerationofother than
conventionalatmospheres (ref.4).
FireScenarios
Absolutefirepreventionisimpossibleand perhaps noteven desirableifpossible.Spacecrai_fire
safetymust addressthetradeoffofminimum riskagainstoperationalpracticality,where a minimum,
residualriskleveic_ be definedas the consequences-ofa worst-casefirethatcausingpossiblecom-
ponent damage that_ suspend some ope_tions temporarilybut no human injuries(ref.6). For the
Shuttle,plausiblefire-initiatingscenariosareelectricalbreakdowns (shorts,overloads,and arc track-
ing)or electrom_hanica] overlaea_gV(motorS, ro_g eq_pment, heate_)' For Freedom, Potential
fire-causing scenarios are more numerous. W. Fuller and M. Halverson (cited in ref. 7) condu_d a
qu_'tative risk assessment for the's_tion with im'tiatingfire _scenarios cove_g_electrical shorts,
faults in electrolysis..... units, oxygen le_, chemical reactions, faulty experiments, or improper crew or
ground actions....
A comple_strat_ offireprotectioninspacecrai_thusproceedsfrom theassumption thatfires
or theirprecursorswillhave a finiteprobabilityofoccurrence.Onboard firesafetyin currentand
proposed spacecrai_must then concentrateon firedetection,suppression,and post-firerestoration.
The descriptionand evaluationofthesefire-responsivet chniquesaretheprimary scopeofthisreview.
BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S.SPACECRAFt FIRE SAFETY
The atmosphere in the earlyspacecrai_,Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo,was 100% oxyge-n,an
atmosphere inwhich no common orgv_icmaterialcan trulyresistfirespread.Thisfailingwas empha-
sizedby the disastrousApollo204 firein 1967, occurringduringground testingat_sea-leveI_total
pressure. The_investigationofthe Apollofireledto the development ofnew plasticmaterials,the
adaptationofthe presentflammability-assessmentmethods, and the use ofa dilutedoxygen atmos-
phere forground operations.
The development offire-responsivetechniquesin spacecrai_has been slowerthan that offire-
preventionmeasures (ref.2). In the simpleconfigurationsofMercury, Gemini,and Apollo,the crew
members could observethe completeinteriorofthe pressurizedmodules. Hence, the sensesofthe
humancrew were adequatetodetecttheinitiationofafire.The water gun forfoodreconstitu_on-was
designatedforuse as an emergency fireextinguisher.The Apollospacecrai_system added dedicated
foam-agent fireextinguishers.Itwas not untilthe introductionofthefirstU.S. spacestation,Skylab
in 1973 to 1974,however, thatinstrumented firedetectionwas incorporatedin a spacecral_.The
Skylab system used 30 line-of-sightu|travioletflmnedetectors,placedthroughoutthe station.
The Skylab space stationalsoprovided the environment fora pioneeringtestof low-gravity
flammability,untilrecentlytheonlyquantitativestudyoffirebehaviorunder low gra_ty. The Skylab
_y was an obse1"va_o-noftlae-time-_endent_flame_ont inthe combustionofpractlca]materials,
includingaluminizedMylar,Nylon,neoprene-coatedNylon,polyurethanefoam,and paper.The mater-
i-a|s_r_ _gni_t_[inthe Skylabatmosphere of65% oxyg_e_innitrogen_t _6l_Patotal-pressure.The
flame-spreadratewas Caiculatedfromcomparisonsofthe flame-frontportionon successivemotion-
pictureframes. Kimzey (ref.9 and Appendix C ofref.10)discussedthe Skylab low-gravityand cor-
responc_Ig normal-gravityresultsand made the followingkey observations."
• Flame-spread ratesare always lowerin microgravity,with comparativeratesranging from .15
to .60thosein normal gravity.
• The visibilityofa flame issignificantlyreducedin microgravity.
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• Extinguishment by vacuum is effective, and the flame is extinguished when the available oxygen
decreases sufficiently. A significant side effect is the flame intensification that develops during
the initial phase of venting.
• Extinguishment by water is possible provided the application is controlled and adequate. If
insufficient water strikes a burning material, it always causes a flareup that can scatter burning
material.
The Skylab conclusionsestablishedthe safetyfactorunderlying the use of NASA normal-gravity
flammabilitytestassessments. That is,the material-acceptancecriterionassumes that any item
passingan upward-spreadingnormal-gravitytestwould be no more "flammable"inlow gravity.
Recently, Pogue, one of the Skylab crew members, summarized his conclusions based on first-
hand observations of the flammability study (ref. 11). Pogue also noted that flame-spread rates always
are lower in low gravity than under corresponding normal gravity. However, he warned of some
qualifications to be considered in interpreting the low-gravity flame-spread data for fire-prevention,
detection, and extinguishment applications:
• Porous materials may capture oxygen within items to enhance microgravity flammability.
• Local agitation or displacement of air may occur from the thermomechanical response of burning
materials.
• Local airflow may be inducedby the usualcabin ventilationand aircirculationsystems.
• Local airflow may be inducedby fireextinguishing.
FIRE PROTECTION FOR THE SHUTTLE
The early U.S. human-crew spacecraft were designed to meet specific mission objectives. The
Shuttle, on the other hand, is a component of a complete Space Transportation System (STS). As
originally conceived, the STS was to become the sole system for launching, maintaining, and retrieving
orbiting satellites and space probes. For practical and economic reasons, the inclusion of all space
activities into the human-crew STS has not occurred. Currently, world-wide launch operations use
non-crewed expendable launch vehicles (ELV), and the U.S. retains a mix of the STS and ELV space
transportation.
Fire Detection and Suppression Subsystem
The Shuttle normally has a pressurized atmosphere only in the front cabin, and the fuselage
payload bay is exposed to the vacuum of space. For the increasing number of Shuttle missions dedi-
cated to microgravity research, such as USML-1, the "payload" is the laboratory connected to the cabin
by an air lock and tunnel. The pressurized laboratory shares its life-support system with the Shuttle
cabin.
Fireprotectionforthe Shuttlecabinand any pressurizedlaboratoryisprovidedthrough a Fire
Detectionand SuppressionSubsystem,which isa component ofthe ShuttleEnvironmental Control
and LifeSupport System (ECLSS). The Shuttlecabinand itspressurizedlaboratoriesuse ionization-
typesmoke detectors.Two unitsarelocatedineachofthreeelectronicsbays forredundancy (asingle-
faulttolerantsystem).The smoke detectorsare identicalinprincipletoionizationdetectorsin com-
mon use in buildingsand aircraft,although they have particularadaptationsfor spacecraftuse
(ref.12). An integralfan createsa flowacrossentranceport to the ionizationchamber to bypass
larger,high-momentum particles,assumed tobe dust,not smoke. The fan flowalsoinsuresadequate
sampling in the absenceofnaturalconvection.Unfortunately,the bypass system may rejectlarger
smoke agglomerates,possiblycharacteristicofa microgravityfire,reducingthe detectorsensitivity.
The setpoints,determinedby normal-gravitysmoke-chamber calibrations,areestablishedatverysen-
sitivelevels,however, wellbelow thoseassociatedwith visiblesmoke.
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Fig. i shows the flight deck fire-protection panel, which has indicators for smoke-detector alarm
status and actuators for the fixed fire extinguishers installed in the Shuttle cabin and in its payload-
bay laboratory. These extinguishers, as well as additional portable extinguishers, are charged with
Halon 1301 (bromotrifluoromethane). The manufacture and commercial use of Halon 1301, which is
recognized as having a potential to deplete ozone in the stratosphere, is to be eliminated by inter-
national protocol in the next decade. There are no immediate plans for replacement of the Halon 1301
agent on the Shuttle. While Halon 1301 is a very effective agent for many fires, it can generate halo-
gen acid gases, w_ch are toxic and corrosive. Shuttle mission rules call for an immediate termination
of the mission and return to Earth following discharge of a fire extinguisher.
Shuttle Mission Experience
Several minor incidents _th fire-causing potenti_ have occurred on Shuttle missions (ref. 13).
On two reported occasions, the crew detected a smoke odor, and subsequent examination showed
overheated components. In the first incident, on STS-6, April 1983, an odor was caused by the fusing
of overheated wires near a space-processing unit. No degradation products were found in an atmos-
pheric sampling;, presumably, the carbon filter in the Shuttle ECLSS was effective in removing the
trace compounds contributing to the odor. In the second incident, on STS-35, December 1990, the crew
reporteda smoke odor and a one:ampere currentsurge,beforethe failureofan overheatedresistor
inan elapsed-timecircuitofa digitaldisplayunitshut offpower totheunit.No atmosphericchanges
were otherwisenoted. Recently,the STS-50 crew (July 1992)reportedan odorand the failureofa
medical apparatus,which was latertracedtoa blown electricalcapacitor.
An incidentofpotentiallygreaterconsequenceoccurredon STS-28,August 1989,when a cable
strainand insulationfailurecausedan electricalshortcircuitata teleprinterunit.The crew observed
sparks and 4 or 5 glowing embers duringa periodOf_0Ut one to two secondsatthe vicinityofthe
cable.One ofthe smoke detectorsshowed an increasedparticle-concentrationlevelof158 pg/m sfor
about 60 sec,with a momentary peak at 180 pg/m q,levelswellbelow the alarm set point of 2000
l_/ms. Based on the observed mass ofpyrolyzedmaterialreleasedfrom the b_ed wireinsulation,
calcu]ati0nSshowedthat the air-borneparticleconcentrationcouldhave exceededtheset-pointconcen-
_tion (C. -Asun'6i0n andB.H_hless,_ckwell International, internal letter, October 1990). Several
: reasons for the]ow_oSse_eld Smoke-concentrationievel-reading were suggested:
• Some pyrolyzed mass was in particles larger than 50 txm (as observed by the crew) that bypassed
the detector chamber:
• Some mass was in pa_cles adsorbed on surfaces.
• Some mass was produced as gasesrather than as aerosols.
The Shuttle mission experience confirms that breakdowns threatening incipient fires have finite
probabilities. At the same time, the fire-protective systems and the alertness of the crew have been
shown to be effective in recognizing and responding to these minor incidents.
FIRE PROTECTION FOR THE SPACE STATION FREEDOM
The proposed :SpaCestation Freedom _li not be the first perm_ently inhabited satellite system
of this kind. Freedom,-_oW_er, repre§ents the first completely Original approach to this spacecom-
munity, rather than a derivative assemblage with adapted components from earlier missions. Freedom
will provide greatly expanded accommodations fdrT_ science studiesl microgravity science and tech-
nology, earth observations, space probe launching, and satellite servicing. Obviously, potential hazard
situations and consequent fire-protection demands will increase considerably over the proposed 30
),ears ofc0ntinuous:opera_0ns, compared to those for the short-duration missions of the Shuttle.
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Preliminary Assembly and Atmospheres
Eventually, the Space Station Freedom assembly will evolve into a complex truss, module, and
attachment assembly, the configuration usually publicized. The immediate concern of fire safety,
however, is in the protection of the Man-Tended Configuration (MTC). The MTC is the minimum
assembly of components necessary to sustain human activities within the station, a state anticipated
to be completed in about six Shuttle-tended assembly operations, perhaps a year or so at_r the date
of the first element launch (fig. 2). The working volume of the MTC consists of three pressurized
modules: a laboratory, resource node, and docking adapter (ref. 14). The module atmosphere will have
a composition of 30% oxygen in nitrogen at a total pressure of 72 kPa to permit ready egress for space-
suited extravehicular activities, without the need for prebreathing to avoid decompression sickness
(ref. 15). Clearly, this enriched-oxygen atmosphere increases the potential fire hazard over that of
standard air. Freedom will be occupied by the crew only during the Shuttle-tended periods from the
MTC until the final configuration of the Permanently Manned Capability. The pressurized atmosphere
will be retained in the modules during the untended periods between assembly phases.
Fire-Protection Principles
The designs for the Space Station Freedom fire protection follow the principles established for
the Shuttle. Again, flammability testing will screen out many materials and components from use.
The Fire Detection and Suppression subsystem (FDS) is a component of the Environmental Control
and Life Support System (ECLSS). The key requirements for fire detection and suppression (H. Kolns-
berg, Boeing, unpublished presentation, Nov. 1991) are summarized as
• independent FDS in each module or element,
• fire protection of untended locations without need for monitoring by onboard or ground personnel,
• data management system to provide a remote signal indicating a fire and fire location,
• automatic and manual means of fire suppression,
• nontoxic extinguishing agents compatible with the ECLSS, and
• single-failure-tolerant designs for the FDS.
These common-sense requirements have proven to be very difficult to meet, however, because of the
severe limitations on mass, volume, and power in the station. The ability of current designs in achiev-
ing the desired goal of efficient FDS operation in the confined quarters of Freedom remains to be
demonstrated.
Freedom Fire-Detection Designs
The interior of the cylindrical Space Station Freedom modules has a central core surrounded by
banks of racks along the walls, ceiling, and floor for installation of equipment for experiments, flight
monitoring, life support, and housekeeping (fig. 3). The basic configuration of a standard rack, con-
structed of graphite-epoxy composite materials, is illustrated in fig. 4. Powered racks, those with
utilities and electricity, are to be protected with a smoke detector in the internal ventilating-air return
collector and a solenoid-activated signal-flag alarm indicator. In the proposed Freedom smoke-detector,
shown in concept in fig. 5, smoke particles in the air stream attenuate and scatter a laser beam.
Radiation sensors in the detector provide an analog signal proportional to the smoke-particle concen-
tration. Prototype smoke detectors are now being evaluated in normal-gravity tests for smoke res-
ponse, mechanical characteristics, and electrical performance.
The single-point-failuretolerancespecificationstatedintheprecedingsectionimpliestheredun-
dancy that,upon the failureofa primary system,protectionwillbe retainedthrough an equallyreli-
ablesecondarysystem. InitialFreedom designsofferedredundancy by duplicatephotoelectricsmoke
and thermal detectorsin each powered rackand additionalsmoke detectorsin the common module
air-supplyducting. Design simplifications,however, eliminatedthe thermal detectors(which are
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probablyineffectiveforearlywarning,anyhow) to savemass and eliminatedthe common ductingin
favorofindividualfansfordistributedventilationsystems in each powered rack. New approaches to
guarantee single-failuretoleranceinthe currentECLSS designsare stillunder consideration.
Firedetectionin the centralmodule core,incontrasttothatin the powered racks,isprovided
by flame detectors,sensingradiationfrom overheatingcomponents orincipientflames. The proposed
Space StationFreedom flame detectorsincorporatethreesensorsin each unit,tuned toultraviolet,
visible,and infraredwavelength bands. Built-intestequipment in the form ofinternallightsources
offerperiodicoperationalchecks.While thisdetectorconcepthas the advantage ofmultiple-response
logicfrom three signalsto distinguisha potentialfirefrom strayradiation,appropriatealarm set
pointsare not yetestablished.These definitionsrequireinformationon microgravityflametempera-
tures,spectralqualities,and theirtime variations.
Fig.6 isa sketchofthe end coneofthelaboratorymodule,identifyingseveralofthemany com-
ponents mounted on, or passing through,the end cone. The proposed flame detectoris shown,
installedfora lineofsightintothe centralmodel core.Sincea correspondingdetectorwillbe mounted
on the oppositeend cone,the two detectors,observingin effectthe same volume, satisfythe single-
failure-tolerantdesignrequirement.
While the smoke and flame detectors discussed are the fire-detection systems currently specified
for the Freedom MTC configuration, alternative concepts are under study. An obvious method of
promise is the use of atmospheric gas sampling, already considered for ECLSS quality monitoring
(ref. 16). The most sensitive indication of pyrolysis and combustion of almost all organic materials is
carbon monoxide evolution, although effective sampling systems must be devised for improved res-
ponse times if gas-sampling applications to fire detection are considered (ref. 13).
Freedom Fire-SuppressionDesigns
For the Space Station Freedom, the designated fire-suppression agent is carbon dioxide, which
offers environmental and logistic advantages over the current Shuttle agent, Halon 1301. The selec-
tion of carbon dioxide is justified by the results of several system trade-off studies (summarized in
ref. 8) and normal-gravity evaluations (ref. 17). The removal of excess carbon dioxide, at least in
modest quantities, is within the capabiii-_es of the Space Station Freedom ECLSS.
The Freedom fire-suppression designs must meet specified requirements (M. Gard, NASA Mar-
shall, unpublished presentation, March 1992). Foremost among these are
• confirmation of a fire prior to automatic suppressant release,
• allowableCO 2leakagetothe generaImodule tobe no greaterthan a maximum concentration,
tobe specified,- ............ :-= ....
• CO2 Sup_ Tn _tnymodule sufficientforatleasttwo releasesintothe largestenclosedvolume
(powered rack), • • _:_ = ___ - - . .-
• two portablefireextinguisherslocatedin separateareas in each module,
• ___each_portab!efireextingui's_hercapableofextinguishingafireinthelargestenclosedvolume,and
• inadvertentCO_ releasepreventedby two-failuretolerantdesigns.
_ne proposed fire-suppressionsystem,which isa derivativeofthe currentShuttletechnology,
consistsofa combinationoffixedand portableextinguishers.In brief,the logic,shown ina simplified
representationinfig.7,offerschoicesofno action,manual suppression,orautomaticsuppressionin
response to an apparent firealarm. The automaticsystem is a centralizedeliverysystem with
remotelyopera_re!_ease valvesat each powered rack. A conceptualsketchofthe proposed system
is shown in fig.8. The portablefireextinguisherswillbe accessibleat each end-cone location,as
shown in fig. 6.
218
The Freedom fire-suppression system is sized to deliver suppressant to achieve a 50%-voi. concen-
tration in the largest powered rack (with excess pressure venting as necessary) within one minute of
agent release. The designers prefer to avoid two-phase flow in the delivery system; hence, the system
is limited in capacity, because the carbon dioxide storage must be at less than the saturation pressure
at ambient temperatures, i.e., as a superheated gas (ref. 18).
Freedom Fire-Suppression Problems
It is evident that there are serious problems to be resolved in the design and operation of the
Freedom fire-suppression system. The most important issues are
* non-conformity to the general requirements for the FDS,
- lack of commonality among international program partners, and
. prescribed agent that is unacceptable for use in the Hyperbaric Air Lock.
Despite the requirement limiting the maximum atmospheric leakage concentration of carbon
dioxide, the designation of this agent as meeting the "nontoxic" requirement may be questioned. In
addition, the redundancy for the single-failure-tolerance has not been achieved. Original design pro-
posals called for backup suppression by venting the atmosphere to the vacuum of space. At present,
the objections to venting are that the venting flow temporarily enhances the burning rate in micro-
gravity (ref. 9), the final total pressure for guaranteed fire suppression is unknown, and the stores of
makeup atmospheres for reconstitution after venting are limited.
The Space Station Freedom is an international program, with Japan and the European Space
Agency (ESA) each contributing pressurized laboratory modules in the final space-station configura-
tion. The international laboratories will be assembled after the MTC, but their development is now
underway. The FDS designs for the international modules are derived independently of the corres-
ponding U.S. subsystems, but the subsystems interconnect through common data-management systems
and intermodule ventilation flows. All three international partners now agree on a carbon dioxide
system for fire suppression, with many details equivalent in principle to those established for the U.S.
modules. There are, however, some primary design and operational differences. Most of these varia-
tions do not affect safety, but one discrepancy is of concern. Because of possible system icing and
limited pressure-relief capacity, the suppressant-flow system cannot deliver the required quantity of
carbon dioxide in one minute in the ESA module. A maximum release-time specification of 30 minutes
was requested, an unreasonable delay time for fire suppression in a closed environment. A compro-
mise goal of 10-rain delivery time is now under consideration, a delay that still is regarded as unsatis-
factory by safety specialists.
The Hyperbaric Air Lock (HAL) isa chamber withinone ofthe modules, sizedtoaccommodate
a patientand a medical attendantfortreatmentof decompression sicknessand forothermedical
activities.While the HAL isnot a component ofthe MTC assembly,itsfireprotectionis actively
under development. The HAL willhave an atmosphere of21% 03 in nitrogenat a maximum total
pressureof340 kPa. Ifcarbendioxideisreleasedtoextinguishafireinthe HAL, the medicalspecial-
istsfearthatthe resultingpartialpressureofcarbondioxideatthe proposed suppressionconcentra-
tionin the HAL willbe highlytoxic.
A recentcommunication (S.Pool,NASA Johnson, unpublished letter,April 1992) discussed
alternativefire-preventionand suppressionapproachesforthe HAL, althoughnone oftheseareready
fordevelopment. The HAL proposalistoretainthecommon fire-detectionsystem oftheU.S.labora-
torymodule,but toinstalla separate,dedicatedfire-suppressionsystem. The proposedfire-suppres-
sionconceptincludesnitrogenpurgingofelectricaland instrument racks withinthe HAL forfirst-
orderfireprevention.Primary firesuppressionwillbe furnishedby a portablenitrogenextinguisher,
which isa method thathas no designcounterpartin conventionalfire-extinguishertechnology.In
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addition,a fixednitrogen-suppressionsystemwillreleasenitrogentodilutethe HAL atmosphere after
extinguishmentto preventreignition.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper discussedthe featuresoffireprotectionincorporatedintocurrentand proposed U.S.
human-crew spacecra/t.In general,thereisa strongrelianceon preventivemeasures along with use
ofproven detectionand suppressiontechniques.The experiencewith minor "near-fires"on Shuttle
missions has shown that the crew responseisthe major factorin alleviatingdanger, but designed
safetyprovisionsofferan adequatebackup.
For the futureSpace StationFreedom, dependence on human responsewillnot be sufficient,and
reliableautomated fireprotectionisessential.The difficultiesfacingtheFreedom environmental-and
safety-designspecialistsmust be appreciated.The principaldriversforthe designsand operations
are the stringentand sometimes conflicting(and o/tenchanging)specifications,tobe met withinthe
severerestrictionson materialand component mass, volume,power,qualitycontrol,and cost.Certain
alternatives,such asthoseformultiple-failure-tolerantfea ures,awaitnew inventionswellbeyond the
presentstate-of-the-art.In addition,thefire-safetyprovisionsmust advancethegoaloffullutilization
ofFreedom, must allowforthe long-durationconductofavariedcrew,and must satisfythe individual
safetyapproaches ofinternationalpartnerstiedintothe common safetynetwork.
While itwould appearthatmicrogravitycombustion researchplaysa secondaryroleinspacecraft
fire-protectionstrategies,effectiveand trustworthyfireprotectioncan benefitgreatlyfrom funda-
mental scientificknowledge. The microgravitycombustion researchcommunity has much to offer
advanced spacecraftfiresafety.Already spacecraftfiresafetyisguidedby preliminaryinformation
on microgravityventilationeffectsand radiantflame (non-flickering)characteristics.Examples of
otherimportantneedsthatmay be addressedby microgravitycombustionresearcharethe assessment
and predictionofmaterialflammability,the physicaland radiantcharacteristicsoffires,gaseous and
aerosolemissionsfrom fires,thephysicaland chemicalactionsofextinguishment,and the long-dura-
tiontoxicand corrosiveeffectsofcombustion and extinguishmentproducts.
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Figure 2. - Sketch of tile Man-Tended Configuration of Space Station Freedon,
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Figure 3. - Phantom view of the U.S. Laboratory Module for Freedom, showing central core and
rack arrangement (Boeing design).
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Figure 4. - Typical rack design for the Space Station Freedom.
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Figure 6. - End-cone arrangement of Freedom Laboratory Module
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_gure 7. - Firo detection and suppression response logic for Freedom.
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Figure 8. - Proposed Space Station Freedom carbon dioxide suppression system.
225

SESSION F - IGNITION, SMOLDER, AND FLAME SPREAD OF
CONDENSED PHASE FUELS
(Chair, Raymond Friedman)
PREOEO_,NG PPlGE BLANK NOT FTLMED

